Why Do Digital Native News Media Fail? An Investigation of Failure in the Early Start-Up Phase by Buschow, Christopher
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 51–61
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v8i2.2677
Article
Why Do Digital Native News Media Fail? An Investigation of Failure in the
Early Start-Up Phase
Christopher Buschow
Department of Media Management, Faculty of Media, Bauhaus-Universität Weimar, 99423 Weimar, Germany; E-Mail:
christopher.buschow@uni-weimar.de
Submitted: 4 December 2019 | Accepted: 20 February 2020 | Published: 16 April 2020
Abstract
Digital native news media have great potential for improving journalism. Theoretically, they can be the sites where new
products, novel revenue streams and alternativeways of organizing digital journalism are discovered, tested, and advanced.
In practice, however, the situation appears to be more complicated. Besides the normal pressures facing new businesses,
entrepreneurs in digital news are faced with specific challenges. Against the background of general and journalism spe-
cific entrepreneurship literature, and in light of a practice–theoretical approach, this qualitative case study research on
15 German digital native news media outlets empirically investigates what barriers curb their innovative capacity in the
early start-up phase. In the newmedia organizations under study here, there are—among other problems—a high degree
of homogeneity within founding teams, tensions between journalistic and economic practices, insufficient user orienta-
tion, as well as a tendency for organizations to be underfinanced. The patterns of failure investigated in this study can raise
awareness, help news start-ups avoid common mistakes before actually entering the market, and help industry experts
and investors to realistically estimate the potential of new ventures within the digital news industry.
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1. Introduction
Entrepreneurship and novel business ventures are seen
as crucial drivers of media industry change and trans-
formation (e.g., Deuze & Witschge, 2020; Küng, 2015;
van Weezel, 2010). In theory, digital native news out-
lets such as BuzzFeed (US), Mediapart (France) or
De Correspondent (Netherlands) can be environments
where new products, alternative revenue streams, and
innovative ways of organizing digital journalism are dis-
covered, tested, and advanced. However, in practice, the
situation seems to be more complicated. Regardless of
the type of industry, most newly established ventures
fail: In developed countries, only around half of them
remain in business for at least five years (Shane, 2008,
p. 98). Moreover, besides the usual pressures that cause
start-ups to terminate business such as market compe-
tition or poor product performance, previous research
has shown that entrepreneurs in digital news face chal-
lenges such as lack of business knowledge, low social
capital, entrenched legacy media thinking, and role con-
flicts (e.g., Heft & Dogruel, 2019; Naldi & Picard, 2012;
Powers & Zambrano, 2016; Salaverría, Sádaba, Breiner,
& Warner, 2019).
While some research has been carried out on their
difficult market situation (e.g., Bruno & Nielsen, 2012;
Nicholls, Shabbir, & Nielsen, 2016), there a particular re-
search gap persists concerning the typical pitfalls of dig-
ital native news media in their early start-up phase dur-
ing the period in which the conditions of the media mar-
ket have not yet exerted much pressure on them. As in
other industries (e.g., Loasby, 2007), it is assumed that
many of these ventures never reach a company life-cycle
stage where they can operate and potentially thrive in
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 51–61 51
the market. Therefore, this article addresses the follow-
ing research question:
RQ:Why do digital native newsmedia fail in their early
start-up phase?
To answer this question, 15 news start-ups in the German
market were examined applying in-depth case study re-
search. The article approaches its research topic from a
practice–theoretical angle (e.g., Champenois, Lefebvre, &
Ronteau, 2019; Witschge & Harbers, 2018): By closely fo-
cusing on actual patterns of entrepreneurial activity dur-
ing the early start-up stage, a detailed and nuanced pic-
ture of the mutual processes surrounding the failure of
digital native newsmedia can be drawn, going beyond the
often vague factors compiled in general entrepreneurship
literature. The conclusions of this study can help news
start-ups to survive the rough phase before actual mar-
ket entry and help industry experts as well as investors to
realistically estimate potential of these ventures.
2. Theoretical Approaches
2.1. Potential of Digital Native News Media in the
Transformation of Journalism
In the last few years, globally, a large number of new jour-
nalistic organizations—often referred to as digital-born
newsmedia, digital native newsmedia, news/journalism
start-ups—have been started aside from traditional com-
panies and institutionalized media markets (e.g., Arrese
& Kaufmann, 2016; Deuze &Witschge, 2020; Sehl, 2019;
Usher & Kammer, 2019;Wu, 2016). Exemplarily ventures
include outlets such as The Huffington Post in the US,
El Diario in Spain, Krautreporter in Germany, or Zetland
in Denmark. An established definition states that these
outlets are built around a digital presence, have no for-
mal affiliation to any legacy news organization, and seek
to be recognized as journalistic by their peers (Bruno
& Nielsen, 2012; Deuze & Witschge, 2020; Powers &
Zambrano, 2016).
In Germany, for instance, several of these ventures
have been launched in the last couple of years, partic-
ularly following the economic and financial downturn
of the late 2000s and the closure of newspapers such
as the German edition of The Financial Times in 2012
(Buschow, 2018). Unlike in the US (e.g., Pew Research
Center, 2019), no precise figures and longitudinal data
are available. In sum, however, the crisis has affected
the Germanmediamarket to a lesser degree: Germany is
still regarded as a newspaper country with a media land-
scape mainly populated by private legacy players and
public broadcasters (Friedrichsen, 2017; Nicholls et al.,
2016). This creates a complicated market situation for
new entrants (if they evenmake it that far). Moreover, lit-
tle private seed funding (e.g., venture capital) is available
(Buschow, 2018) and despite the increasingly difficult
situation of local journalism, state subsidies have only
recently been discussed. In contrast to other European
countries (e.g., van Kranenburg, 2017), so far, there are
only a few small, regionally-orientated innovation funds
for new media organizations available. Overall, the me-
dia market’s relatively stable situation and the lack of
seed funding reduces the probability of success for start-
ups in German journalism.
Nevertheless, even in this situation digital native
news media are perceived as laboratories for innovation
and as trendsetters, offering hope for the future of jour-
nalism (Buschow, 2018). At least two streams of litera-
ture from media management research explain their in-
novative potential:
1. Unlike legacy media organizations, news start-ups
are, in principle, far less dependent on extant
sector-specific traditions and aim to differentiate
themselves from other established market play-
ers. Above all, it seems important that they are
born and “imprinted” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 153)
under conditions of digital network media. This
is what fundamentally distinguishes them from
newspaper publishers who are often caught up
in the structural logic of their main production
technology—i.e., printing media—and the result-
ing production rhythms, work practices, business
models, etc. (Koch, 2008). Therefore, from the per-
spective of the organizational path dependency ap-
proach (Sydow, Schreyögg, & Koch, 2009), in con-
trast to traditional media houses, start-ups might
bemore likely to create novel products, alternative
revenue streams, and organizationmodels for jour-
nalism aside from the current industry pathways.
2. Neo-institutional analysis suggests that isomorphic
tendencies between start-ups and legacymediawill
arise (Carroll & Hannan, 2000; DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). These convergences are driven by an in-
crease in the number of actorswho observe and im-
itate alternative structures, practices, and products
as well as by the exchange of employees between
these organizations. Hence, new institutionalism
implies that novel ventures can act as role models
and prototypes for the transformation of legacyme-
dia companies and the industry as a whole (Deuze,
2017; Wagemans, Witschge, & Deuze, 2016).
In light of these theoretical arguments, new venture cre-
ation appears to be a promising engine of innovation and
renewal in the media industry. In practice, however, the
realization of this theoretical potential is limited by the
problems and challenges faced by novel organizations in
digital journalism.
2.2. Causes of Failure: Why Do Start-Ups Terminate
Business?
In line with empirical success factor research within stud-
ies of business and management, research into gen-
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eral entrepreneurship is primarily concerned with fac-
tors that enhance the chances of a start-up’s prosper-
ity. However, this stream of literature cannot hide the
fact that, regardless of the industry type, high start-up
closure rates are observed: For instance, Schindele and
Weyh (2011) were able to show that 50 percent of all
businesses in aWestGerman cohort started from1976 to
2005 were shut down during their first six to seven years.
Entrepreneurship research expects a general “liability of
newness”: The younger an organization, the higher the
probability of its shutdown (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 148).
However, it should be noted that not all start-ups close
through failure, but through their own profitable exit or
voluntary discontinuation (Parker, 2009, pp. 386–388).
In general, companies go through several develop-
ment stages along a defined life-cycle (e.g., Greiner,
1972), typically divided into pre-seed, seed, growth,
establishment, and consolidation/revitalization. Van
Gelderen, Thurik, and Bosma (2005, p. 366) further dif-
ferentiate the early start-up phase (pre-seed and seed)
into four stages: A first stage, where the intention to es-
tablish an enterprise is developed; a second, where the
entrepreneurial opportunity is recognized and a concept
is developed; a third, where resources are allocated and
the organization is set-up; and a fourth, where the ven-
ture starts to operate on the market. The latter three
stages, in particular, describe the crucial entrepreneurial
process of moving from a simple business idea to the
growth of a company.
However, in each of these life-cycle phases, a vari-
ety of individual, organizational, and structural reasons
can lead to the termination of activities—implying that
a company does not reach the next phase of the life-
cycle. Regardless of the stage of development, a review
of entrepreneurship literature shows that the following
sources of failure are typically considered in research
(e.g., Carroll & Hannan, 2000; Neumann, 2017; Parker,
2009; Stinchcombe, 1965):
• Knowledge, i.e., lack of (business/industry) ex-
perience, education, entrepreneurial capabilities,
managerial ability, technical skills;
• Team constellations, i.e., small number of
founders, coordination difficulties, lack of
competences;
• Resources, i.e., insufficient assets, lack of (seed)
money, initial capital (liability of smallness);
• Networks, i.e., difficulties of establishing relation-
ships with customers, suppliers, and business
partners;
• Industry configuration, i.e., characteristics of mar-
kets, intensity of competition, lack of need for
product(s);
• Legitimacy, i.e., lack of societal acceptance and
reputation.
This summary of general failure factors sensitizes re-
searchers to possible lines of inquiry. However, it seems
almost impossible to compile a both comprehensive and
adequately specified list of determinants spanning all
industries. Moreover, previous research seldom distin-
guishes the patterns of failure which relate to a com-
pany’s stage in its life-cycle (van Gelderen et al., 2005).
Thus, a greater empirical value should lie in the close in-
vestigation of certain start-ups’ specific challenges in or-
der to obtain a detailed and differentiated understand-
ing of the processes surrounding failure in one industry
(Neumann, 2017).
As themedia industry differs considerably fromother
industries (Lowe, 2016), there is reason to assume that
patterns of failure are likewise distinct from start-ups’
demise in other sectors. Indeed, previous research has
stressed the following problem areas faced by news
start-ups: lack of business and market knowledge due to
founders’ professional backgrounds in journalism (e.g.,
Salaverría et al., 2019); low social and symbolic capital
held by journalist founders (Powers & Zambrano, 2016);
entrenched legacy media thinking applied to new ven-
tures, which leads to outdated ideas about organiza-
tions, revenue models, users etc. (Naldi & Picard, 2012;
Sommer, 2018); as well as role conflicts that give rise to
ethical challenges and organizational tensions (Carbasse,
2015; Heft & Dogruel, 2019). However, although failure
appears to be common in digital native news media, and
even the survival of a newly started organization is of-
ten considered a success (e.g., Brouwers, 2018; Bruno &
Nielsen, 2012), the current state of research on this topic
is still limited. So far, findings have tended to be merely
auxiliary findings, having been gleaned from other stud-
ies which actually had different research interests.
Hence, in this literature review, two central limita-
tions become apparent: First, the rather generalized fac-
tors which lead to failure, as identified by entrepreneur-
ship studies, are too vague and are of only limited help
in the sector-specific study of news start-ups. Second, al-
though some research has been carried out on the (dif-
ficult) market conditions for digital native news media
(e.g., Bruno&Nielsen, 2012; Nicholls et al., 2016), the ac-
tual pitfalls and challenges in starting up such a venture
are not well understood. In particular, the early start-up
phase before media market conditions are able to exert
much pressure has received little research attention so
far. These limitations clearly underline the persistence of
the research gap concerning the failure of digital native
news outlets.
2.3. Practice–Theoretical Perspective: Understanding
Failure in Start-Up Practices of Digital-Born News Media
In order to fill this gap and explore the failure of new ven-
tures in the news industry in as nuanced a way as pos-
sible, this study applies a practice–theoretical perspec-
tive. Although a fragmented stream of literature with
different schools of thought, theories of practice have
attracted increasing attention in numerous fields of so-
cial sciences in recent years, since they potentially of-
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fer innovative ways of conceptualizing the social world
(e.g., Nicolini, 2012; Reckwitz, 2002; Shove, Pantzar, &
Watson, 2012). This is also true for journalism studies
(e.g., Witschge & Harbers, 2018) and entrepreneurship
research (e.g., Champenois et al., 2019; Johannisson,
2011). For instance, Champenois et al. (2019) recom-
mended basically re-focusing entrepreneurship research
“towards real entrepreneurial actions in which concrete
people engage in particular times and in particular places
or circumstances” (p. 6).
In this regard, theories of social practice are a par-
ticularly promising starting point for research in under-
explored fields: While traditional entrepreneurship stud-
ies often tend to describe and explain starting up primar-
ily based on the founders’ intentions and characteristics
or market determinants and, in doing so, overemphasize
the role of either individual actors’ capabilities or struc-
tural conditions, practice theories avoid such shortfalls
(Champenois et al., 2019; Johannisson, 2011). A prac-
tice point of view helps to overcome the current lack
of systematic understanding of new venture creation
in the news industry by focusing on the concrete, situ-
ated activities in the ongoing processual becoming of an
organization—on entrepreneurs’ every-day steps in the
creation of a new organization. The fundamental con-
stituents of this process are considered to be social prac-
tices, typically understood as patterns of action that are
regularly enacted in similar ways by different actors at
different times and at different places/circumstances.
From this theoretical angle, starting a digital native
news media organization is characterized by a set of in-
terrelated start-up practices through which such orga-
nizations are developed and, if successful, perpetuated
(Shove et al., 2012). In empirical research, start-up prac-
tices are not predefined by extant categories or defi-
nitions, rather they are uncovered from a “bottom-up”
perspective in order to grasp the context-specific en-
trepreneurial activities, resources, procedures as well as
the meaning attached to them in practice (Champenois
et al., 2019). In this study, practice theories form
“a heuristic device, a sensitising ‘framework”’ (Reckwitz,
2002, p. 257) for the empirical exploration of activi-
ties as well as the failures in setting up a digital na-
tive news media—a process that has so far remained
largely unexplored.
3. Methods
A practice–theoretical approach calls for an open and
exploratory research design in order to reveal a broad
range of specific sources of failure in start-up practices.
Therefore, qualitative comparative case study research
(Yin, 2014) was conducted, investigating 15 digital-born
news media within the German market. Cases were in-
cluded that met the definition in Section 2.1: Those
ventures which started independently of legacy media
organizations—no spin-offs or new business units of tra-
ditional publishers or broadcasters—as well as ventures
primarily focused on the production of journalism, not
its dissemination or distribution, and ventures that de-
scribed themselves as journalistic and seek to be recog-
nized as such by their peers.
3.1. Sample
Because of the volatility and opacity of the field under
investigation, three complementary pre-studies (a stan-
dardized survey of 29 German media experts, a sys-
tematic analysis of trade media coverage as well as an
investigation of investors, media industry congresses,
and awards/prizes) were triangulated to identify a pop-
ulation of around 200 German news ventures. From
this population, 15 cases were selected for in-depth
research.
Case selection was based on a most-different design
reflecting the following consideration: If the same en-
trepreneurial activities and challenges occur in a broad
variety of disparate organizations, this should increase
the generalizability of the empirical findings. The diver-
sity of the cases was determined by the following three
criteria, that were determined prior to the in-depth in-
vestigation: 1) company status (for profit vs. not-for-
profit; identified by corporate form); 2) type of media
product(s) produced (digital pure player vs. hybrid me-
dia products, e.g., both online and print publications);
3) audience scope (broad general coverage vs. special-
ized niche journalism).
All start-ups investigated were a maximum of four
years old and in one of the following three early stages
differentiated by van Gelderen et al. (2005): concept de-
velopment, resource allocation, or first market opera-
tions. To reduce “survival bias”—a bias toward organiza-
tions that have succeeded (Parker, 2009, p. 8)—ventures
that (at the time of investigation) either struggled with
their business or had already been shut down were in-
cluded as well. Even though this study focuses on failure,
it was not only failed cases that were examined: This was
to provide a retrospective view of the entire process of
venture creation and to identify critical turning points in
the history of companies. Due to the number of cases
investigated, no longitudinal research framework could
be applied. Despite their diversity, what these compa-
nies share is that, overall, they have a small workforce
size (typically only founders and a network of support-
ers), achieve low audience reach and—even if they work
for profit—do not generate a major surplus for their
founders. Table 1 gives a more detailed overview of the
cases examined in this study.
3.2. Data Collection
The 15 selected cases were examined in-depth, based on
the triangulation of 22 qualitative, semi-structured inter-
viewswith founders (approx. 32 hours of audiomaterial),
164 external and internal documents and, where possi-
ble, short site visits.
Media and Communication, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 51–61 54
Table 1. Cases investigated in empirical research.
Case Age Company status Type of media product(s) Audience scope Status at time of investigation
1 2 years For profit Hybrid General In operation
2 Less than 1 year Not-for-profit Digital pure player General Struggling
3 1 year For profit Hybrid General In operation
4 2 years For profit Digital pure player General In operation
5 4 years For profit Digital pure player General In operation
6 1 year For profit Hybrid Niche In operation
7 2 years For profit Hybrid General Struggling
8 4 years For profit Digital pure player Niche Failed
9 2 years For profit Digital pure player Niche Struggling
10 4 years Not-for-profit Hybrid General In operation
11 2 years For profit Digital pure player Niche Failed
12 2 years For profit Hybrid General In operation
13 1 year For profit Hybrid General In operation
14 1 year For profit Digital pure player General Struggling
15 2 years For profit Hybrid General In operation
To address the research question, interviews were
primarily aimed at a detailed reconstruction of the or-
ganization’s early start-up phase with its every-day ac-
tivities and events, decisions, as well as the barriers it
faced. Documents used included internal (e.g., strategy
papers, business plans) and external (e.g., interviews
with founders in trade media, manifestos) texts by and
about the organization, which had been produced with-
out researcher’s influence; they were included to gather
further information from the company’s past as well as
indications of the intentions, goals, and objectives of the
start-ups. Site visits focused on working procedures and
organizational structures (by means of observable arte-
facts) and were recorded in the form of field notes.
Data collection took place in 2015within a broader re-
search project (Buschow, 2018). The case studies had to
be anonymized to prevent any harm to the organizations
involved, even if this reduces the research’s reliability.
3.3. Data Analysis
All three data types obtained (interviews, documents,
and field notes) were included in a qualitative con-
tent analysis (Mayring, 2000). Following up on practice–
theoretical assumptions (e.g., Gherardi, 2019; Nicolini,
2012), the initial objective was to uncover start-up prac-
tices by analyzing the data bottom-up.
First, for each of the 15 cases, the nature of the or-
ganization’s set up was derived from the data: What lo-
cal activities were associated with starting an individ-
ual venture? Second, common activities were grouped
across the entire sample of organizations with the aim
to empirically show the typical ways of developing a
new venture in German journalism. From this catego-
rization procedure across cases, the following start-up
practices emerged: Administrating, staffing/team build-
ing, networking/motivating, moderating, experimenting,
and financing. To answer the research question, in a third
step, for each of the six start-up practices, the pitfalls and
challenges were reconstructed from the data: Where did
founders stumble? Which specific barriers curbed the in-
novative capacities of these news start-ups?
4. Findings and Discussion
Why do news start-ups fail at an early stage of develop-
ment? In what follows, context-specific and detailed pat-
terns of failure are traced from the empirical case study
research. Results are organized according to the six start-
up practices typically involved in the development of a
news venture in Germany: Administrating, staffing/team
building, networking/motivating, moderating, experi-
menting, and financing. The practice–theoretical angle
forms the interpretative background of the following dis-
cussion, while the findings are also discussed against the
backdrop of literature from entrepreneurship research
and journalism studies.
4.1. Administrating: Challenging Tasks and
Unexpectedly High Workload
All cases under investigation highlight that starting a new
organization in German journalism requires far more ex-
tensive and diverse work than being a freelance journal-
ist. In particular, administrative practices (e.g., account-
ing, negotiating contracts, technology administration),
formerly undertaken by the management side of news-
paper publishers, also become the founders’ responsibil-
ity (cf. Salaverría et al., 2019). In contrast, founders who
initially expected that ‘doing entrepreneurship’ would
open up new freedom for their own journalistic work—
writing, filming, producing, etc.—clearly underestimated
the steps involved in setting up a new venture (e.g.,
cases 5, 9, 10, 11).
Around half of the cases investigated emerged as a
result of criticism of legacy newspaper publishers, with
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which founders were dissatisfied (cases 1, 3, 5, 6, 9,
11, 14, 15). Many accused newspapers of hindering real
journalistic work: “The journalism of legacy newspaper
publishers is exactly that kind of journalism I do not
want to do anymore. If there was only this journalism
left, I would leave the profession” (case 15). Against
this background, it is particularly noteworthy that the
founders of case 11—after only a short period in their
entrepreneurial role—clearly regretted that the support
from publishers was now no longer available to them:
“Please give us exactly these publishing staff [we al-
ways criticized as a barrier in legacy publishers]! Now
we learned what newspaper publishers do for us and
how they give us journalists the support [in terms of ad-
ministration] we need” (case 11). Many of these non-
journalistic tasks are necessary even if fast growth, huge
profits or a lucrative ‘exit’ from the company are not the
main objectives of their founders, for instance, because
they work on a not-for-profit basis.
The cases underline that news entrepreneurs in
Germany are often (former) journalists (cases 2, 3, 7, 9,
11, 12, 15) who now operate beyond the scope of their
previous activities and have not yet developed “standard
social routines” (Stinchcombe, 1965, p. 149) for their
new roles. This is also because new ventures can emerge
rather spontaneously: Practice theories help to under-
stand the study’s empirical finding that some founders
‘stumble’ into their role (e.g., cases 12, 13, 15). It is
only through what they do, based on the start-up prac-
tices they adopt, that they become recognized and de-
scribed as news entrepreneurs by others. For instance,
the initiators of case 12 suddenly found themselves in
the entrepreneurs’ role, even though they had never in-
tended this; trade media reported on them, they were
regarded as role models and invited as speakers to news
start-up conferences. Interpreted against practice theo-
ries, founders are actuallymade in their roles by the start-
up practices they adopt (Shove et al., 2012)—and, as the
cases from the study show, there is a lot of potential for
failure due to the challenging (administrative) tasks and
unexpectedly high workload.
4.2. Staffing: Teams Are too Homogeneous
Concerning staffing, the teams behind German digi-
tal native news media are remarkably homogeneous.
Founders rarely come from industries or professions
other than journalism. Only two ventures in the di-
verse sample were started solely by outsiders: Case 8
by founders from culture and philosophy, case 14 by
founders with backgrounds in general management, de-
sign, and technology. As mentioned above, many of the
entrepreneurs in the sample had had traditional indus-
try careers (cases 2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15): journalism
schools, traineeships, and editorial jobs at newspapers
or broadcasters.
When teams are formed around personalities with
similar backgrounds, the diversity of emerging chal-
lenges to starting up cannot always be efficiently ad-
dressed by the founders. It may be—as in some of the
cases (7, 9, 11, 12)—that there are no competent actors
in the team to accomplish certain practices (e.g., activ-
ities in technology development, or sales). As a result,
work often has to be outsourced (see Section 4.3) or
these practices are completely neglected, possibly delay-
ing or even suppressing the development of new ven-
tures. Against this background, homogeneity of teams
can thus be a decisive source of failure.
In contrast, if staffing brings together founders with
complementary expertise, the diverse practices in news
ventures can be undertakenwith greater skill and flexibly.
Founders with business backgrounds can help to tackle
administrative practices involved in setting up new me-
dia companies (see Section 4.1). Coders and developers
can help keep pace with the newest technological devel-
opments. One founder interviewed in the study under-
lines the need to include outsiders: “I do not really need
any journalists. I do not want to do [business] with jour-
nalists” (case 15).
When outsiders are part of a team, this can also help
to adopt mindsets and practices from other industries
and professions, which may lead to newways of thinking
in journalism. As research on organizational formation
has shown (e.g., Padgett & Powell, 2012), innovation is
most likely to be generated where people with multiple
professional backgrounds collaborate.
4.3. Networking: Lack of Contacts and Relationships
Even if complementary skills are combined in a team,
founders can hardly be expected to solve all en-
trepreneurial challenges on their own. From the very be-
ginning, they need support to help them through the
early start-up phase. However, in most cases, these sup-
porters cannot be employed permanently. Thus, news
ventures in Germany are heavily dependent on free-
lancers. Such assistance from the outside is needed in
journalistic work but also in design, technology devel-
opment, marketing, product, legal and accounting—in
some cases unpaid as Table 2 highlights.
Empirical evidence from the cases highlights the de-
velopment of relationships beyond the borders of the
organization—i.e., networking—to be a core practice of
founders in the early start-up phase. Since work is often
unpaid, a key issue for founders is to motivate these sup-
porters in the absence of financial incentives. Case 1 ex-
presses this as follows: “In journalism, where so much is
accomplished through social capital, it is hard to say that
it does not matter which parties you go to.” This result
corresponds to research by Powers and Zambrano (2016)
who can show that social and symbolic capital are crucial
resources for new venture creation in the news industry.
In sum, the news start-ups under study here differ
from extant publishing houses in that they have a post-
industrial form of organization in which several tasks are
outsourced to a network of partners. During the planned
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Table 2. Partners involved and type of integration.
Partners (Individual/corporate) Type of integration Cases
Authors and supporters in journalism Paid 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 14, 15
Unpaid 1, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14
Designers (graphic design, editorial design, user experience reviews) Paid 4, 6, 14, 15
Unpaid 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13
Developers, coders (including web development), data experts Paid 1, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14
Unpaid 9, 11, 12, 13
Marketing, branding, sales consultants Paid —
Unpaid 1, 2, 3, 12
Strategy, business/start-up consultants, project/product managers Paid 11
Unpaid 3, 7, 9
Legal advisers and lawyers Paid 4
Unpaid 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13
Accountants Paid 12
Unpaid 2, 5, 7, 13, 15
site visits this became particularly clear:most of the orga-
nizations could not be investigated in person (cases 1, 2,
7–10, 12, 13, 15) because they did not have permanent
offices, butmainly workedwith their supporters virtually
through digital media tools. Conversely, if social capital is
missing, a news start-up is hard tomaintain and establish
in Germany. A lack of networking, thus, is an important
source of failure.
4.4. Moderating: Conflicts between Journalistic and
Economic Practices
One consequence of the diverse everyday en-
trepreneurial activities in news ventures is a conflict be-
tween journalistic and economic perspectives. Typically,
in digital-born news media there is a clash of certain
start-up practices: Since founders have to be involved
all over the place, traditionally competing and contradic-
tory tasks of media work are taken on simultaneously by
a single person.
As soon as the editor-in-chief of a venture—as in
case 10—sells advertising space in parallel to writing sto-
ries, those in charge find themselves in a paradoxical dual
role conducting editorial as well as economic practices
(cf. Heft & Dogruel, 2019). The potential conflicts of inter-
ests become more acute in those ventures where there
is no physical division between departments in separated
offices since work is mostly organized virtually (cases 1, 2,
7–10, 12, 13, 15). Therefore, in start-ups, it is particularly
difficult to achieve the news media’s traditional separa-
tion between “church and state” (Carbasse, 2015, p. 267).
The cases illustrate that founders do reflect on such
role conflicts; however, with increasing financial pres-
sure it becomes difficult to remain true to one’s own stan-
dards. For instance, in case 11 the team was forced to
choose between “accepting a large corporate publishing
project [something the founders had always refused to
do] or running into personal bankruptcy.” Subsequently,
if no attempt is made to moderate these conflicts, some
ventures cannot proceed due to contradictory and an-
tagonistic practices during the start-up process. This po-
tential source of failure clearly distinguishes digital-born
news media from start-ups in other industries, where
such conflicting objectives either do not arise or do so
much less frequently.
4.5. Experimenting: Ignoring the User’s Perspective
When Starting Up
In contrast to research by Sommer (2018) who found
high market and user orientation among (later stage)
news start-ups, the digital native media examined in this
study are often initiated from a media creators’ perspec-
tive that seeks to replicate certain professional standards
of journalism under conditions of digital media (cases 1,
2, 3, 7–9, 11, 12, 13, 15). Founders first focus on the
production of high-quality content rather than on profit
and growth (cf. Deuze, 2017). However, this leads them
to largely conceptualize their venture from a journalis-
tic viewpoint. Thus, the interests and needs of potential
users play only aminor role in their experimentationwith
news media content and new journalistic products.
This is aptly illuminated by case 9: Founders of this
venture initially pursued two journalistic business ideas
and finally chose the one that promised greater market
potential—however, the market potential was not seen
in terms of users, but in terms of journalistic talent and
input. This meant that it was easier for the founders to
retrieve existing content from fellow journalists and their
networks: “That was the reason why we started [case 9]:
Because we immediately had a few authors and knew
there were good pictures, good stories” (case 9). Case 9
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also illustrates that the success of a venture is deliber-
ately delayed because of journalistic principles:
Many journalistic products today write according to
what people want to read….We could [also] do that,
which would probably help us to create a certain
reach more quickly….But I don’t want to limit myself,
I don’t feel like doing this….[What wewant is to] open
new doors for the reader that they may not have
thought of. (case 9)
The fact that journalists often ‘disregard’ their readers
is a well-known, historical finding of journalism research
(e.g., Beam, 1995), even though increasing datafication
and software-based audience observation have let to al-
tered editorial practices in recent years (Tandoc, 2019).
Under volatile conditions of the digital market, ignoring
the user’s perspective has become even more problem-
atic. One of the news entrepreneurs sums up his observa-
tion from the failure of his venture as follows: “You can-
not pass by the reader these days….This will rarely work
immediately or if it does, then only for a short period.
Therefore, always try to stay in touch [with your users]”
(case 11).
The finding points to the fact that history also ‘mat-
ters’ in digital native newsmedia. These organizations do
not emerge out of nowhere, but—as seen through the
lens of practice theories—are always shaped by the prior
practices of their founders (Nicolini, 2012). Sincemany of
them had had an earlier career in legacy journalism orga-
nizations (see Section 4.2), it is not surprising that long-
standing practices and mindsets were transferred into
new ventures. As a result of such “formational myopia”
(Naldi & Picard, 2012, pp. 76–77), digital native newsme-
dia can be subject to an organizational path dependency
as well (Sydow et al., 2009)—which is a decisive source
of failure as these organizations then apply the same (un-
successful) methods as legacy publishers do to respond
to market challenges. One of the founders of case 14, an
industry outsider, sums it up as follows:
Start-up founders in news industry…tend to disregard
the business model. They [want] to revitalize the old
business model. I think this is a great pity. We notice
that the oldmodel…is simply being continued….I have
never seen such a thing in any other industry before.
(case 14)
4.6. Financing: (Under-)Financing News Start-Ups
Today, starting up in the news industry is very cheap, to
beginwith. Similar to the findings by Compaine andHoag
(2012), German news ventures report only very few fac-
tors that hinder initial market access, as barriers to en-
try (e.g., costs of technology) haven fallen sharply with
the rise of digital media. “You do not need much. All
you need is a computer, an Internet connection, and a
Wordpress system,” states the founder of case 5.
However, lowered barriers to initiating a media prod-
uct in the digital market can lead to misconceptions and
false incentives. The financing practices under study here
highlight that German news ventures clearly underesti-
mate the cost drivers of later day-to-day business: the
difficulty in acquiring users and paying customers; com-
munication via an increasing number of new socialmedia
platforms; and, above all, the labor-intensive production
of high-quality content. For instance, the French digital
nativeMediapart, whichwas launched in 2007 by former
Le Monde and Libération journalists (Wagemans et al.,
2016), required almost six million Euro in its initial phase.
The founders had made serious miscalculations, several
times they had to attract further investors (Alfon, 2017).
This study also documents cases with very low financial
capital: For instance, the founder of case 1 started her
business with around 1,000 Euro that she earned by sell-
ing 20 bottles of wine that her grandmother had given
her at birth.
This is why news start-ups in the German market are
often underfunded. Subsequently, atypical working re-
lationships arise in some places (e.g., see Table 2): Key
practices end up performed by employees who are en-
gaged on temporary, sometimes voluntary, case-by-case
basis. This dependency on unpaidwork can contribute to
a somehowparadoxical phenomenon:While digital-born
newsmedia are oftenmotivated by critique of traditional
publishers (see Section 4.1) and try to counteract their
precarization of journalism (Örnebring & Conill, 2016),
they actually continue the familiar cost-saving tenden-
cies of legacy news publishers and—as an unintended
effect (Giddens, 1984)—thus even perpetuate this pre-
carization. Against this background,misjudgments about
the financial needs of digital native media organizations
must be considered as a major source of failure.
5. Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research
This article, by taking a practice–theoretical standpoint,
has reconstructed the typical challenges and pitfalls in
accomplishing start-up practices in the news industry.
Beyond the rather vague categorizations of general en-
trepreneurship studies (cf. Section 2.2), the empirical
bottom-up research conducted here contributes signifi-
cantly to a context-specific understanding and interpreta-
tion of the failure of digital native news ventures in their
early start-up phase.
Notwithstanding market conditions and structural
contexts that obviously play a central role in failure
within later development stages, this study focused on
the pre-market phase in order to identify those barriers
within start-up practices that can hinder the launch of a
business in its initial phase even beforemediamarket fac-
tors exert any pressure. The cases studied shed light on
typical start-up practices and key failures associated with
them which need to be tackled before actually entering
the market and creating media products:
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1. Founders need to develop a realistic picture of the
administrative practices and the exactworkload in-
volved in starting up: They need to knowwhat they
are actually getting involved in;
2. It needs honesty that founders will not be able
to handle everything on their own: Staffing and
team building should be focused on bringing com-
plementary skillsets together to carry out start-up
practices more effectively;
3. In every fieldwhere teams lack expertise, founders
need to rely on networking—i.e., their social
capital—in order tomotivate support to help them
through the early start-up phase;
4. Founders must anticipate the potential (ethical)
conflict between journalism and economics and
develop ad hoc procedures to moderate this con-
flict during day-to-day business;
5. Such conflict can relate to user andmarket orienta-
tion: Even if such an orientation seems inevitable
when experimenting with digital media products,
it must not lead to journalistic standards being
undermined;
6. Founders should be highly aware of the financial
expenses that a news start-up requires: In their fi-
nancing efforts, they should not fall for the false
incentives that loweredmarket entry barriers have
created.
If digital-born news media are to realize their theoret-
ical potential as engines of innovation and renewal in
the media industry (cf. Section 2.1), they must survive
and prosper. However, in general, founders tend to be
overoptimistic and rate the probability of failure as un-
realistic (Parker, 2009, pp. 124–128). It is likely that news
entrepreneurs alsomisjudge the challenges theywill face
when establishing new media ventures. Moreover, for
founders who were previously journalists, setbacks are
still conceptualized as a major problem, something to be
avoided rather than a tool to learn from, as Brouwers
(2018) points out. In general entrepreneurship literature,
it is argued that first one generation of new ventures has
to fail so that others can learn and thrive (e.g., Parker,
2009). News start-ups launched today are attempting to
gain knowledge from the past failures of their predeces-
sors in order to pre-empt and avoid the risks. Findings
from this study can help nascent entrepreneurs in these
efforts as well as emphasize the importance of failure for
the overall news market.
Since this study examined the patterns of failure in
the early start-up phase when new ventures are not yet
exposed to the (competitive) circumstances of a specific
(national) media market, the results from the particular
German context should be of interest for, and largely be
transferable to, other parts of the world. However, there
are certainly differences between countries that com-
parative future research on news start-ups should con-
sider (cf. Section 2.1): For instance, the amount of public
and private seed funding (e.g., Kosterich &Weber, 2019),
which is insufficient for news start-ups in Germany, as
well as the characteristics of founders (e.g., their will-
ingness to take risks), which differ between geographical
and cultural regions (Buschow & Laugemann, 2020).
This article has limitations that open up avenues for
future research: Although sampling was based on amaxi-
mum variation approach and thus covered awide variety
of news start-ups in the field, this study only investigated
the German market. On this basis, research could be ex-
tended to more markets and regions and compare pat-
terns of failure between them (e.g., Powers & Zambrano,
2016). In addition, research should be expanded to in-
clude the factors that contribute to the failure of later
life-cycle stages such asmarket pressure, product charac-
teristics, growth crisis, etc. Furthermore, to better under-
stand the complex processes of a news start-up’s demise,
future studies should draw on research designs that col-
lect data at several points in time over a certain period
of the company life-cycle; the present study has not ap-
plied a longitudinal design. In this context, ethnographic
research approaches could prove useful. Such follow-up
research would further deepen our understanding of the
causes and processes surrounding failure, help develop
measures to tackle them, and eventually help digital na-
tive news media to prosper.
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